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Like  most  countries  in  the  Middle  East,  the  Islamic  Republic  of  Iran  is  an 
undemocratic  country.  The  most  powerful  person  in  the  government,  the  supreme 
leader, is not elected by popular vote and holds the office for life, while those opposing 
the concept of clerical rule are repressed.
During  the  presidency  of  Mohammad  Khatami  from  1997  to  2005  Iran 
underwent liberalization. In the hopes of reforming the system, opposition was allowed 
to debate about the regime and its alternatives. Many expressed hope that Iran would 
democratize, but in the end Khatami was unable to reform the system and liberalization 
policies were rolled back by the early 2000s. Yet the aftereffects of this era continue to 
influence Iran's politics to this day, as the demands of the oppositional Green Movement 
echo  those  voiced  during  the  Khatami  era,  and  as  the  authoritarian  regime  pays 
considerably  more  attention  to  the  economy  than  in  the  early  years  following  the 
Islamic Revolution.
Very few articles covering this period of liberalization tie the case of Iran with 
general  liberalization  and  /  or  transition  theories.  Most  articles  put  the  setbacks  of 
Khatami's reform program down to reasons particular to Iran's political system or the 
president’s personality. His failure has been explained with the inconsistencies in his 
ideology  (Masroori  2007),  his  temperance  (Takeyh  2009:185),  his  unwillingness  to 
publicly  side  with  the  opposition (Gheissari  and Nasr  2006:140),  and the  extensive 
powers of the supreme leader (Kamrava and Hassan-Yari 2004).
This thesis argues that the causes  for Khatami's  reform program's failure are 
structural  and  not  unique  to  Iran.  To  this  end,  the  transition  theory  of  Guillermo 
O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, with additional comments from Adam Przeworski 
and Graeme Gill, is used as a theoretical framework for the case study of Iran under 
president Khatami from 1997 to 2005.
O'Donnell and Schmitter's theory brings out the most important political actors, 
the dynamics of the actors’ relationship and the necessary conditions for a transition. 
This framework enables analysis of Khatami's lack of success in reforming the system 
in terms of institutional structure and political organization.
The theoretical framework is divided into two parts. The first chapter covers the 
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stages  of  transition,  explaining  the  connection  between  liberalization  and 
democratization.  The  second  chapter  focuses  on  the  conditions  of  a  transition  by 
bringing out three conditions that should be present to prevent an abortive liberalization, 
meaning a situation where the rights and guarantees are once again taken away by the 
regime. Chapters three and four apply this framework to the empirical case of Iran, first 
by structuring the Khatami era into three stages, and then by checking whether the three 
necessary conditions for a transition were met.
1. The stages of transition
This chapter explains how under favorable conditions, liberalization can set off a 
chain of events that eventually lead to transition of power. This process can be divided 
into three stages. First, most peaceful transitions are set off by liberalization policies 
initiated  by  the  authoritarian  regime  itself.  This  is  followed  by  mobilization  of  the 
masses against the regime (labeled here as the “popular upsurge”), which in turn might 
provide the momentum for the actual transition, often by convincing the authoritarian 
regime  and  the  opposition  that  negotiating  with  each  other  is  the  best  option.  A 
successful transition of power allows democratization to begin.
1.1. First stage: liberalization
The main premise of O'Donnell and Schmitter's theory is that transitions begin 
with fissures inside the regime. Among those who rule an authoritarian country, there 
have to be some people who think the regime is losing legitimacy and should broaden 
its base of support. These soft-liners believe that in order to maintain power, the regime 
has to liberalize (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1991:16).
Liberalization can be defined as a process which makes “effective certain rights 
that protect both individuals and social groups from arbitrary or illegal acts committed 
by  the  state  or  third parties.”  These  rights  may include  habeas  corpus,  freedom of 
speech, sanctity of private home and correspondence, freedom to associate voluntarily 
with other  citizens,  relaxation of  media censorship etc.  (Ibid.:7).  Liberalization may 
initially  remain  informal,  when  the  regime  signals  greater  tolerance  for  certain 
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activities, even if no new legislation concerning these rights and guarantees is passed 
(Gill 2000:47).
However,  there are  always members of  the regime who think that  either  the 
authoritarian regime is not facing a crisis serious enough to merit reforms or that power 
can maintained through increased coercion over the population. These are hard-liners 
who oppose liberalization (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1991:16).
Usually  liberalization  is  initiated  when  the  regime  is  going  through  a  crisis 
(Ibid.:17). The crisis (or crises) undermining the regime may, but does not have to be, 
an  economic  downturn  (Przeworski  1988:97).  Nevertheless,  whatever  problems  the 
regime is facing, they are usually caused by domestic factors, and international pressure 
is a secondary factor (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1991:18).
The  distinction  between  hard-liners  and  soft-liners  is  mainly  based  on  their 
preferred strategies for maintaining power, and crises bring out the fault-lines inside the 
regime most clearly. O'Donnell and Schmitter's theory presumes that political actors are 
rational and make decisions based on cost and benefit analysis (Przeworski 1988:53-54; 
O'Donnell  and Schmitter  1991:74).  Soft-liners  do not  initiate  liberalization  with the 
intention to bring about the collapse of the regime and establish a democracy. On the 
contrary, soft-liners believe they can control the liberalization process and revive the 
regime by gaining greater legitimacy among the population (O'Donnell and Schmitter 
1991:24).
As the terms “hard-line” and “soft-line” denote strategic postures (Przeworski 
1988:53, 55), concrete people and groups may change their strategy. There will always 
be pragmatists, who can ally with either side, depending on whose tactic they consider  
more viable. In the first stage of transition, soft-liners have the upper hand compared to 
hard-liners.  If  hard-liners cannot offer  any solutions besides continued repression of 
dissent, then soft-liners can convince the pragmatic members of the regime to support 
their liberalization policies. These pragmatists use a “wait and see” tactic to see if the 
soft-liners' approach succeeds (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1991:26-27).
1.2. Second stage: the popular upsurge
Liberalization, even in the form of a minor extension of rights and guarantees, 
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tends to bring about mass mobilization among the population (O'Donnell and Schmitter 
1991:48). At first, when the regime announces toleration of some collective action and 
contestation of issues which were previously not allowed, only a few individuals dare to 
test these new limits. If they are not punished by the regime, other people follow their 
example. This grows into what O'Donnell and Schmitter (1991:48-54) call the “popular 
upsurge” or the “resurrection of the civil society,” as more and more people become 
politicized, discuss the crimes of and alternatives to the current authoritarian regime, 
and discover common ideals through these debates.
At this point liberalization escapes regime's control and moves into the second, 
popular upsurge stage.  According to  Przeworski  liberalization is  inherently unstable, 
because contrary to the intentions of soft-liners, it  undermines the legitimacy of the 
regime  by  making  the  discussion  of  alternatives  possible  (1995:58-59).  Artists, 
intellectuals,  universities,  literary  and  academic  journals,  professional  associations, 
labor unions, human rights organizations and the like all become energized to demand 
more concessions from the regime (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1991:49-53).
These diverse oppositional forces that spring up can also be divided into two 
strategic postures – moderates and radicals.  Moderates are people and groups in the 
opposition willing to work with the soft-liners, hoping that if they give soft-liners some 
guarantees  and  concessions,  the  authoritarian  regime  will  step  down  peacefully 
(Przeworski 1995:67-68). In turn, radicals tend to believe that the regime is so morally 
corrupt and the opposition so strong that no negotiations with the authoritarian rulers are 
needed (Ibid.:68-69).
On the grounds of this distinction,  it  can be assumed that moderates use the 
channels  provided  by  the  liberalization  policies  to  voice  their  demands  for  more 
concessions,  whereas  radicals  prefer  to  go  outside  these  channels  by  holding  mass 
protests and strikes to push the authoritarian regime from power.
Even  though  liberalization  usually  does  not  go  according  to  soft-liners' 
expectations,  they might be willing consider working with moderates to  negotiate  a 
transition to democracy. This is often because soft-liners either have a reason to believe 
they are popular enough to win even in democratically held elections, or on the contrary,  
because they realize that since they are going to lose power inevitably, they might as 
well step down in a way that allows them to portray themselves as heroes who helped to 
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lead the country toward a better future (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1991:25). Whatever 
their future calculations, being risk-averse, soft-liners realize that a full-scale repression 
will widen the gap between the regime and the general population even more, while 
leaving the problems which convinced them to liberalize in the first place unsolved. 
They consider co-operating with the opposition to be potentially more productive than 
stubbornly trying to hold the authoritarian regime together at any cost.
In turn, in this stage hard-liners are even more reluctant to give away power than 
before.  Now that  the  masses  are  actively demanding the  regime to fall,  hard-liners' 
worst fears have come true and they see an urgent need for wide-scale intervention to 
stop the process from escalating further (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1991:26-27). Their 
argument goes like this: soft-liners went against their wishes and relaxed control over 
the society, and just like hard-liners predicted, this weakened the regime even more. In 
the view of the hard-liners, liberalization policies need to be rolled back and dissent 
must  be  repressed  as  soon  as  possible.  They  realize  that  the  longer  liberalization 
continues, the harder it will be to suppress the upsurge (Ibid.:53).
Popular upsurge and splits within the regime reinforce each other (Przeworski 
1995:57). As the opposition starts mobilizing, soft- and hard-liners continue to grow 
further apart in terms of the strategies they prefer. Even if the liberalization was very 
limited  in  the  beginning,  people  will  start  demanding  more  guarantees  and  rights 
(O'Donnell and Schmitter 1991:10), while visible disunity inside the regime signals the 
society that the authoritarian system is weakening.
In the second stage, many pragmatists who initially at least implicitly supported 
the soft-liners may change their position and ally with the hard-liners. Compared to the 
first stage, the arguments of soft-liners have been refuted and hard-liners have an easier 
time in finding allies inside the regime (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1991:26-27). 
1.2.1 The four political actors
Below, table 1 describes the strategic postures of the four political actors in the 
end of the second, popular upsurge stage. These dispositions set the stage for the next 
developments, whether it is a violent stand-off or a peaceful transition.
Soft-liners and moderates are risk averse and prefer to avoid violence, while 
hard-liners and radicals are more willing to use violence.
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Soft-liners
Regime insiders. Willing to co-operate 
with the opposition to avoid violence and 
maintain power or get concessions for 
stepping down.
Hard-liners
Maximalists inside the regime. Believe 
repression is possible even after popular 
mobilization. May see their rule in terms of 
a mission and democracy as chaotic and 
dangerous, which makes them unwilling to 
co-operate with the opposition.
Moderates
In the opposition. Willing to negotiate and 
give some concessions to the regime in 
order to keep the transition peaceful. 
Adapt cautious tactics, as they fear the 
hard-liners' violent reaction more than 
radicals do.
Radicals
Maximalists in the opposition. Unwilling 
to negotiate with the regime, prepared to 
use force to push authoritarian rulers from 
power.
Graph 1: the main characteristics of each political actor; based on O'Donnell and  
Schmitter 1991, and Przeworski 1995.
The popular upsurge is the critical stage of the transition. Here, soft-liners have 
to be able to hold the hard-liners back from repressing the mobilized masses. Moderates 
need to make sure that radicals do not become so violent and dominant to make soft-
liners doubt the possibility of negotiations and concessions (Przeworski 1995:69).  If 
hard-liners triumph, opposition will be violently suppressed and liberalization policies 
will be rolled back. In worst case scenario, if hard-liners and radicals both prevail over 
their more moderate counterparts, the stand-off can escalate to a civil war. However, if 
the soft-liners and moderates succeed in holding them back, the process can move on to 
the third, transition stage.
1.3. Third stage: regime breakdown and transition of power
In the third stage, the old authoritarian regime breaks down and is replaced by a 
new  system  of  institutions.  There  are  three  general  scenarios  when  liberalization 
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initiated  from  inside  the  regime  results  in  a  transition  of  power  (O'Donnell  and 
Schmitter 1991:39):
(a) The  opposition  is  so  strong and  authoritarian  regime  so  discredited  that  the 
regime is forced to step down;
(b) Soft-liners  inside  the  regime are  strong and confident  enough to  control  the 
transition to democracy on their own terms. The institutional structure changes, 
but some members of the old regime maintain power;
(c) Soft-liners and moderates negotiate a peaceful transfer of power.
This thesis follows O'Donnell and Schmitter by focusing on the last situation, 
which is a transition through extrication. Here, soft-liners and moderates negotiate a 
compromise, i.e., a pact (either formal or informal) where they “forgo or underutilize 
their capacity to harm each other by extending guarantees not to threaten each others' 
corporate autonomies or vital interests,” (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1991:38). Pacts may, 
for example,  entail  guarantees against  prosecution for the actions undertaken during 
authoritarian rule so the old regime feels confident enough to step down (Gill 2000:56).
As O'Donnell and Schmitter (1991:72) conclude, political democracy “emerges 
from the interdependence of conflicting interests and the diversity of discordant ideals, 
in  a  context  which encourages  strategic  interaction  among wary and weary  actors.” 
Successful  negotiations conclude with an agreement  when important  actors feel  that 
they have either a chance to compete for power and economic welfare within the new 
(democratic) institutions or that the agreement provides them concessions that protect 
them from the  retaliation for  the  acts  committed under  the old  authoritarian regime 
(Przeworski 1995:30,68).
Not every transition results  in a democracy. However,  a transition set  off  by 
liberalization and followed by popular upsurge is a relatively good starting point for 
democratization. From the three scenarios, a pacted transition is possible  only when 
neither party feels strong enough to dictate the terms of the transition – when soft-liners 
believe the costs of crackdown are too high; and moderates understand that if they do 
not make some compromises soft-liners might ally with the hard-liners and roll back 
liberalization policies (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1991:38-39).
Actors taking part in negotiations know that they cannot eliminate any actor, and 
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thus they are compelled to compete for power. Together, soft-liners and moderates have 
a chance in holding back hard-liners and radicals, especially as the latter's ranks are 
thinning out due to the fatigue popular mobilization is bound to bring (O'Donnell and 
Schmitter  1991:56).  As  the  negotiations  are  already  taking  place,  many  initial 
maximalists may also adopt a “wait and see” approach.
2. The necessary conditions for a transition
There is no guarantee that the transition will result in a democracy. O'Donnell 
and  Schmitter's  theory  provides  a  model  of  how liberalization  might  evolve  into  a 
peaceful transition. However, it  is a schematic theoretical model and there are many 
moments  from liberalization to negotiations where the process  could stop or follow 
another trajectory.
As  their  transition  theory  focuses  and  is  based  on  success  stories  of  South 
Europe,  Latin  America  and Eastern  Europe in  the  1970s and 1980s,  O'Donnell  and 
Schmitter  pay  relatively  little  attention  to  the  causes  of  abortive  liberalizations. 
However,  in  regard  to  the  empirical  case  of  Iran  that  will  be  discussed  later,  three 
conditions can be deduced from their theory that need to be met in order to peacefully 
move  from the  popular  upsurge  stage  on  to  the  transition  stage.  These  are  (1)  the 
presence of soft-line leaders in the military, (2) politically organized opposition and (3) 
moderates dominating the opposition.
2.1. First condition: soft-line leaders in the military
In order to move into the negotiations stage, soft-liners need to be able to hold 
hard-liners back from intervening. It is crucial that even before introducing liberalizing 
reforms, soft-liners have at least a few important supporters in the armed forces. This 
way those advocating for repression of the popular upsurge have to consider that some 
parts of the armed forces might not co-operate with them (Przeworski 1995:25). The 
danger  of  divided  armed  forces  makes  the  argument  of  crushing  the  opposition 
considerably weaker.
Regardless of what the rhetoric soft-liners use or even the laws they pass, if 
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hard-liners dominate the armed forces, the opposition can be crushed and there is not 
much soft-liners can do to stop them. In the worst case scenario, hard-liners can stage a 
coup d'état and remove the soft-liners from power completely.
2.2. Second condition: politically organized opposition
To  convince  regime  members  that  negotiations  are  a  better  option  than 
crackdown  of  the  opposition,  liberalization  must  develop  far  enough  to  allow 
autonomous  political  organization  with  leaders  who  have  broad  support  among  the 
population (Gill 2000:7). This may take the form of a political party or a labor union.
In order to make negotiations possible, important actors inside the regime must 
feel that the cost of repression exceed the cost of co-operation (O'Donnell and Schmitter 
1991:26-27).  As  groups  and  people  can  change  their  preferences  over  time,  an 
opposition who is seen either as divided and weak or as too radical may tip the scales in 
favor of hard-line strategy. A diffused and unorganized opposition is not taken seriously 
as negotiating partners. It is also easier to sow disaccord within atomized opposition, 
which would then waste its energy on fighting with each other instead of forming a 
united block with common demands. In short,  without a strong politically organized 
opposition, the costs of repression are not high enough to motivate regime members to 
even consider giving concessions.
When  discussing  the  oppositional  forces,  Gill  (2000:5)  distinguishes  “civil 
society” from “civil society forces”. He defines civil society as a society where there are 
autonomous groups to aggregate, promote and defend the views, activities and interests 
of individuals even against the state. This requires mutual recognition of legitimacy by 
the state and the civil society, as well the public discussion of issues (Ibid.).
In an authoritarian state, even if some autonomous organizations are tolerated, 
these groups are  strictly  apolitical.  Thus,  authoritarian states may have civil  society 
forces, but no civil society. Gill (2000:6) even goes as far as to say: “Unless groups are 
able to defend their members'  interests politically, they are not really able to defend 
them at all.”
Until  political  parties  or  labor  unions  appear,  the  opposition  forces  are  too 
diffused, heterogeneous and disorganized to be able to negotiate with the regime. The 
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appearance of parties presumes there are leaders who enjoy the approval of enough 
people and groups that they can actually give guarantees in the negotiations with the 
soft-liners (Ibid.:61-62, 127).
Besides guarantees, an organized opposition will also provide an alternative to 
the authoritarian regime. This alternative unites and mobilizes people, as well as giving 
the soft-liners an idea of what to expect in the negotiations stage.
2.3. Third condition: moderates dominating the opposition
To hold negotiations, moderates must dominate the opposition. Even when there 
is a politically organized opposition, soft-liners cannot negotiate with them if they see 
the radicals having the majority. Soft-liners need negotiation partners who can abide by 
the guarantees they give. This will not be the case if moderates cannot convince radicals 
to stop protesting and striking while they hold negotiations. Or as Przeworski (1995:69) 
words it: “Moderate gentlemen in cravats may lead civilized negotiations in government 
palaces, but if the streets are filled with crowds or factories are occupied by workers 
calling for the necks of their interlocutors, their moderation is irrelevant.”
3. Iran from 1997 to 2005: the stages of an abortive liberalization
The Islamic Republic of Iran was established in 1979, after a revolution that 
overthrew the authoritarian and pro-Western regime of the shah. The political system 
combines  theocracy  (manifested  in  the  various  institutions  tasked  with  assuring  all 
executive  and  legislative  affairs  are  in  accordance  with  the  Islamic  law),  with  the 
popularly elected institutions of the presidency and the parliament (Takeyh 2009:16, 24-
27).
This chapter  analyses the time period from 1997 to 2005, when Mohammad 
Khatami held the presidency, treating it  as an example of an abortive liberalization. 
Using the theory of O'Donnell and Schmitter, the period under view is divided into three  
stages - liberalization, popular upsurge, and the political stand-off.
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3.1. First stage: liberalization
3.1.1. Crises threatening the regime
By the mid-nineties, the authoritarian-clerical regime of Iran was facing multiple 
crises  threatening its  stability,  all  of  them primarily  domestic  in  nature.  Firstly,  the 
second  supreme  leader,  Sayyed  Ali  Khamenei  lacked  the  charisma,  the  religious 
credentials and the authority that Grand Ayatollah Khomeini had gained from leading 
the revolution (Mahdavi 2011:96). The regime now had a considerably weaker leader.
Secondly, whereas the masses had played a major role in making the revolution 
happen  (Keddie  2003:296),  they  now  had  grown  alienated  from  the  regime.  For 
example,  students  contributed  considerably  to  the  revolution,  from  taking  part  in 
spreading the fundamental ideology of Khomeini to taking over the American embassy 
(Ashraf and Banuazizi 2001:239; Sadri 2001:274). However, by 1995 it was estimated 
that nearly half of Iran's population had been born after 1979, meaning that they had no 
personal  experience  with  the  revolution.  Now,  students  were  denouncing  the  strict 
Islamic dress codes, not advocating for the enforcement of the Islamic law (Banuazizi 
1995:563, 571).
Thirdly,  as  the  economic  situation  worsened,  the  regime  grown  out  of  the 
resentment  of  the  poor  was  unprepared  to  handle  the  grievances  of  the  expanding 
middle class (Keddie 2003:228; Gheissari and Nasr 2006:134). The devastating eight 
year Iran-Iraq war from 1980 to 1988 had mobilized the masses against a direct outside 
threat, but now the regime had to address the various social and economic problems left 
behind by the war,  many of which were hurting the middle class the most (Takeyh 
2009:29).
All  in all,  the regime had a reason to worry – after all,  economic crisis and 
alienated middle class are a  common cause for many authoritarian regime collapses 
(Gill 2000:15, 18).
3.1.2. Two strategies to address the crises
There  were  considerable disagreements inside the regime on how to  address 
these crises. Hard-liners' tactic was power consolidation and centralization, which they 
hoped to achieve by pushing the rivaling Islamic Left out of the government. This effort 
was  lead  by  the  supreme  leader  Khamenei  himself,  who  appointed  conservatives 
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advocating for the strict interpretation of the Islamic law to important positions in the 
military and the judiciary (Haas 2012:76). Many of the most important positions in the 
government are filled by the supreme leader's appointment (Kamrava and Hassan-Yari 
2004:505)  and  as  Khamenei  wanted  to  strengthen  his  leadership  position  in  the 
government,  he filled these positions with like-minded and loyal conservatives.  The 
logic  of  conservatives  was  that  in  times  of  crises,  the  regime  should  appear  as 
centralized and united as possible.
The  pragmatic  members  of  the  regime,  whose  ranks  included  president 
Rafsanjani,  initially  supported  hard-liners  in  nudging  the  Islamic  Left  out  of  the 
government  (Keddie  2003:266-267).  However,  pragmatists  considered  the  tactics  of 
hard-liners to be insufficient. The economic crisis and growing ranks of the middle class 
had  already  created  a  society  where  dissent  was  brewing,  and  some  journals  were 
beginning to publish highly critical articles on the corruption of politicians despite the 
penalties it brought (Takeyh 2009:121; Banuazizi 1995:563-564).
Because of this atmosphere of crisis, president Rafsanjani had made efforts to 
reform the economy, and to relax the rigid social and cultural laws that were alienating 
the young from the regime. However, his efforts were blocked by the hard-liners, who 
felt that these reforms endangered their position in the government and the stability of 
the regime (Wells 1999:33).
Meanwhile,  the  Islamic  Left,  who had  been losing  power  thanks  to  the  co-
operative  efforts  of  the hard-liners  and the  pragmatists,  were re-emerging with  new 
political  stances and strategy. Since the collapse of Soviet Union had given a major 
blow to  the  credibility  of  the  Left’s  arguments  for  greater  state  intervention  in  the 
economy, they reformed their ideology (Kamrava and Hassan-Yari 2004:514; Safshekan 
and Sabet 2010:547).
As the supreme leader was clearly favoring the Right, they decided to focus on 
the  other  source  of  legitimacy for  their  comeback –  the  people.  Thus the  Left  laid 
economic questions aside and rebranded themselves as the Reformists. Their focus was 
channeled  into  cultural  and  social  reforms  (Safshekan  and  Sabet  2010:547;  Keddie 
2003:266-267).  By  stressing  the  need  to  open  the  regime's  ideology  to  debate,  the 
reformed Islamic Left aimed to re-gain power and re-connect the population with the 
regime at the same time.
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3.1.3. Hard-liners and soft-liners
The political  rivalry between  the Left  and the Right  peaked during the 1997 
presidential  elections.  Candidate  Ali  Akbar  Nateq Nuri  represented  the  hard-liners. 
According to him, the regime's sole purpose was to implement the word of God. As only 
learned clerics well-versed Islamic law can rule and the Supreme Leader's decisions 
should  not  be  questioned,  encouraging  debate  among  the  society  was  seen  as 
unnecessary, potentially dangerous and destabilizing (Takeyh 2009:119). The political 
system established under Khomeini was to be maintained as it was.
Nuri's soft-line opponent was Muhammad Khatami, who had the backing of the 
reformed  Islamic  Left  (Keddie  2003:269).  His  political  platform  argued  for  the 
establishment of democracy, civil society, rule of law, pluralism and dialogue among 
civilizations  (Gheissari  and  Nasr  2006:134;  Arjomand  2009:259).  Previously,  these 
concepts had either been considered anti-Islamic and foreign (Keddie 2003:280), or did 
not even have a Farsi equivalent1.
However,  it  is  important  to  note  that  Khatami  believed  that  these  concepts 
should always be tied with Islam. Everyone has the right to question and debate is 
necessary, but only faith and religion can bring about real liberation, and attacks on the 
foundations of Islam are off limits (Vahdat 2005:657-658). While Khatami did say that 
rulers are accountable to God and the people, and that he wanted an Islamic democracy, 
he left unaddressed the questions of how the Supreme Leader should be elected and 
what the limits of his power should be (Vahdat 2005:658, 660, 664).
In the 1997 presidential elections, the soft-line candidate Khatami won with 70 
percent of the vote (Gheissari and Nasr 2006:130). Although hard-liners controlled the 
most powerful positions and the state media, soft-liners' platform received support from 
the  middle  class,  moderate  clerics,  students,  and  intellectuals  (Gheissari  and  Nasr 
2006:133; Gheissari and Nasr 2004:99).
In addition, Khatami's campaign received help from the pragmatists. After aiding  
the  hard-liners  in  their  efforts  to  push  the  Islamic  Left  out  in  the  early  1990s,  the 
pragmatists felt that the hard-liners were gaining too much influence. So by the 1997 
elections,  pragmatists  were siding with the reformed Left.  Besides giving Khatami's 
1 Iranian words for “civil society” (jame'eh-ye madani), “legality” (qanun-mandi), and “citizen” 
(shahrvandan) are considered to neologisms popularized by Khatami (Arjomand 2009:259).
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campaign financial  support,  the pragmatists  also  used  their  control of  the  executive 
branch to stop hard-liners from rigging the elections (Ashraf and Banuazizi 2001:250-
251).
After  the  Reformists  gained  the  presidency  they  started  implementing 
liberalization policies. Since the legislative and judicial branch were still under hard-
liners' control (Ibid.:251), these policies were largely informal. Using the powers of the 
executive branch, soft-liners made registration of NGOs and political parties easier, and 
relaxed restrictions on newspapers, journals, arts and cinema (Haas 2012:78; Gheissari 
and  Nasr  2006:135-136;  Keddie  2003:276).  Their  actions  were  supplemented  with 
rhetoric signaling greater toleration for debate on political and social issues.
The two-fold aim of re-connecting the population with the regime and re-gaining 
power  was  to  be  achieved  with  popular  pressure,  insider  negotiations,  and 
decentralization. Soft-liners hoped that if the population mobilized behind them, hard-
liners  would be  forced  to  allow liberalization  policies  to  continue.  Since  soft-liners 
would have the backing of the population,  hard-liners would have to negotiate with 
them, appoint soft-liners to important positions, and to decentralize power away from 
the conservative clerics and into the popularly elected institutions.
3.2. Second stage: popular upsurge
Following this liberalization, those people who had once participated in the 1979 
revolution and in the establishment of the Islamic Republic, but at some point had fallen 
out  of  favor  or  became  disillusioned  with  the  regime,  started  speaking  out.  Most 
influential of them was Ayatollah Hossein-Ali Montazeri, a cleric who was at one point  
a favorite to become the next supreme leader but who had later been denounced for his 
criticism of the system (Arjomand 2000:287). Montazeri spoke out against the regime, 
calling the institution of supreme leader to be strictly supervisory and divorced from 
direct administration. He had started making these arguments already in 1988 (Ibid.), 
but  only  when the  media  laws  were  relaxed  could his  ideas  be  discussed  publicly. 
Although he was put under house arrest, he continued making statements and by setting 
an example, encouraged others to go further in their criticism of the regime (Keddie 
2003:275).
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Along  with  Montazeri,  another  important  ideologue  of  the  moderates was 
Abdolkarim Soroush, who argued for a more interpretive reading of Islamic law, and a 
reformation of  Islam (Gheissari  and Nasr 2004:97).  Montazeri  and Soroush became 
very popular, and demands for making the office of supreme leader directly elected with 
a limited term gained popularity (Arjomand 2000:288).
After first brave dissenters spoke out, popular upsurge followed. There was great 
growth in the numbers of active associations, journals and newspapers in circulation, 
and  new  movies  made  (Keddie  2003:276;  Gheissari  and  Nasr  2006:135-136). 
Liberalization policies had the most pronounced effect on the media. Journals started 
covering the corruption, repression and governmental mismanagement of the regime, as 
well as discussing the potential alternatives to the current system (Gheissari and Vali 
2006:135-136; Tarock 2001:591-592).
Many authors discussing the period of liberalization under president Khatami 
bring out only three political forces – regime hard-liners (variously called the Islamic 
Right, conservatives, principalists etc.), pragmatists and the Reformers.2 This may have 
been the case during the 1997 presidential elections, when the middle class, the non-
governmental organizations, moderate clerics, secularists, intellectuals all supported and 
voted for Khatami (Gheissari and Nasr 2006:133; Mahdavi 2011:98). However, as the 
actual liberalization took off and media regulations were relaxed, a lively debate broke 
out over what the relationship between Islam and the government, God and the people 
should be. While many of the people writing for the journals used the same language as 
Khatami (Kamrava 2001:170, 173-174), they went considerably further in the reforms 
they considered necessary to have a civil society, rule of law, and Islamic democracy.
The discussion of  alternatives to  the current  system produced a  considerable 
pluralism of ideas. However, a distinction between regime soft-liners, and opposition 
moderates  and  radicals  is  still  possible.  All moderates,  including  Montazeri  and 
Soroush,  were  similar  in  their  demand  for  an  Islamic  democracy  with  reformed 
institutions3. Their demands went considerably further from what the soft-liners wanted.
Khatami’s pluralism and civil  society required the consent  of the rulers who 
could always stop unwanted discussions by calling them a threat to the foundations of 
2 See, for example Gheissari and Nasr 2006:136, Keddie 2003:282, Haas 2012:70-73.
3 Their views are desribed in more detail by Gheissari and Nasr 2004:97; Arjomand 2000:287-288 and 
Arjomand 2009:260.
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Islam and  thus  off-limits  to  the  people.  Moderates,  in  contrast,  were  arguing  for  a 
popularly elected supreme leader with fixed terms limits (Arjomand 2009:260; Tarock 
2001:591-592).  Had moderates achieved what they advocated for, the regime would 
have altered, because its main pillar, the supreme leader would have undergone a drastic 
change in functions and power. By arguing for reformation of Islam, they accepted that 
the state would have to give up the right to define what is meant by “foundations of 
Islam”, and open these to debate as well4.
Soon, students and secular intellectuals went even further in their demands, and 
started to speak out for a secular democracy (Gheissari and Nasr 2004:99, 103). They 
were the radicals of the liberalization, who wanted to completely dismantle the regime 
and abandon the revolutionary goal of Islamic government. So far, liberalization had 
mostly consisted of the lively public debate expressed via the numerous newspapers and 
journals that were now allowed to be published. Radicals, however,  knew that  their 
views would not be tolerated even under the relaxed media policies. Thus, they used 
protests to express their dissent (Gheissari and Nasr 2004:103; Arjomand 2000:291).
3.2.1. The four political actors
In brief, four political actors developed in the course of the liberalization: hard-
liners opposing any changes to the regime, soft-liners wanting a greater freedom of 
speech and pluralism of  views,  moderates  hoping to  reform the  institutions  into an 
effective  Islamic  democracy,  and  radicals  demanding  a  secular  democracy.  The 
representatives of each strategic posture and their views are listed in table 2.
Had the soft-liners enough control over the regime to negotiate, a compromise 
between the regime and the moderate opposition would have been plausible. Soft-liners 
and moderates were using largely the same vocabulary of civil society, rule of law, and 
democracy (Arjomand 2009:258; Kamrava 2001). Though they differed on extent of 
how much the  regime should  be  reformed,  they  agreed on maintaining  the  Islamic 
disposition of the country. Khatami and other soft-liners had a reason to believe that if  
the system was to be reformed, moderates would allow soft-liners to compete for power 
4 It may be argued that Khatami also wanted an Islamic democracy, but had to limit his criticism of the 
regime to be able to run in the elections. However, as it impossible to know his true intentions, this 
papers positions Khatami and Reformers by their public statements and writings. Khatami used the 
word “democracy“, but he did not speak of the institutional and constitutional reforms needed to give 
people sovereignty. By definition, Iran could not become democratic as long as the supreme leader, 
who was not popularly elected, kept his authority and control over the armed forces.
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in the new framework.
Soft-liners
President Khatami, the executive branch,  
former revolutionaries disillusioned with  
the regime, parliament from 2000 to 2004.
- Islamic democracy with the rule of law, 
greater participation, decentralization, civil 
society
- Rulers are accountable to God and the 
people
- No reformation of the institution of the 
supreme leader is needed, however the 
current constitution needs to be fully 
enforced
- Non-clerics should not question the 
foundations of Islam
Hard-liners
Supreme leader Khamenei, and  
conservative clerics who dominated the  
judiciary, the armed forces, the Guardian  
Council, the state media, and until 1999,  
the parliament. Supporters in the  
economically powerful bazaar.
- Government's task is to enforce Islamic 
law.
- Only learned clerics can rule.
- Democracy is a Western import 
unsuitable to the Iranian society
- Reformists are abandoning the 
revolutionary goals
Moderates
Moderate clerics such as Montazeri and  
Soroush, Islamic liberals and the middle  
class.
- Popularly elected supreme leader
- Reformation of Islam




- Secular democracy with guarantees on 
individual, political and social rights
- The supreme leader needs to step down
Table 2: The main stances of the four political actors; based on Arjomand 2009:258;  
Sadri 2001:274; Takeyh 2009:123, 184; Haas 2012:70-72; Gheissari and Nasr  
2006:131-132, 138-139; Gheissari and Nasr 2004:103; Arjomand 2000:291.
5 While there are many academics who consider Islamic government to be incompatible with 
democracy, this paper assumes that Islamic democracy is not an oxymoron.
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In reality, soft-liners did not feel strong enough to start any negotiations. Hard-
liners had started blocking soft-liners as soon as Khatami was elected. They used the 
judiciary, the parliament and the armed forces to send soft-liners the signal that as soon 
as  liberalization  escaped  regime's  control,  they  would  intervene  (Haas  2012:84-85; 
Tarock 2001:597).
This made soft-liners very cautious. In his rhetoric, president Khatami made it 
clear that he supported the current institutional system and the authority of the supreme 
leader. While he continued speaking about rule of law, civil society and the like, he did 
not dare speak of any constitutional changes (Gheissari and Nasr 2006:140). All those 
groups who had supported Khatami during the 1997 election were becoming more and 
more  disillusioned  with  how  much  the  system  could  be  changed  without  radical 
institutional reforms, and whether it could be reformed from the inside at all (Gheissari 
and  Nasr  2006:140;  Takeyh 2009:185-190).  Soft-liners  and moderates  were  drifting 
further apart.
The feeling of alienation was reinforced in the stand-off stage when the hard-
liners  used  violence,  arrests  and  assassinations  of  those  who  opposed  the  regime. 
During the 1999 student protests, soft-liners were unable to hold hard-liners back, and 
could only caution the protestors to calm down and stop protesting (Gheissari and Nasr 
2006:140). One of the main reasons why these protestors had come to the streets was 
that they had already seen that soft-liners could not bring about any tangible change. 
After 1999, many in the opposition felt that the soft-liners were not only helpless, but 
even taking the hard-liners' side.
3.3. The stand-off
Though  in  a  gradual  way,  hard-liners'  reaction  to  liberalization  policies  had 
began as soon as soft-liners assumed office. Their stand-off hit its peak in 1999, but it 
many ways the tension lasted throughout Khatami's both presidential terms, from 1997 
to 2005, and concerned various questions of authority, such as who could disqualify 
candidates for elections, how much should the Guardian Council and supreme leader 
interfere in the parliament's work, whose orders should the judiciary follow and so on 
(Keddie 2003:276; Arjomand 2009:256,266).
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The  question  of  press  freedom  provides  a  good  illustration  to  the  tensions 
between hard-liners, soft-liners and the opposition. In the course of liberalization, media 
became the central arena for the popular upsurge, as soft-liners had limited power, and 
the most important channel they could use to strengthen their position was the Ministry 
of Culture. Since they did not control the legislative branch, having the media favor 
their policies was the central point of the soft-liners' „pressure from below, negotiations 
from above” approach. By relaxing control and censorship of the media, they hoped to 
get the people to mobilize in support their policies, which would in turn put the pressure 
on the hard-liners (Tarock 2001:589-590). Intellectuals and clerics, regime insiders and 
outsiders, used the media to communicate with the population, and through newspapers 
and  journals,  a  lively  debate  about  the  future  of  the  regime  blossomed  (Tarock 
2001:591-592; Keddie 2003:270-271).
For  the  first  two years,  hard-liners  used  sporadic  intimidation  tactics  on  the 
opposition. While Khatami was giving speeches about establishing the rule of law and 
allowing debate on religion, dissident writer-activists were attacked, arrested or even 
murdered.  A special  Court  for  the  Clergy was set,  which  directly  threatened media 
freedom  because  many  of  the  editors  of  the  oppositional  newspapers  were  clerics 
(Keddie 2003:275; Gheissari and Nasr 2006:138).
From time to time, reform-minded newspapers were closed down by the hard-
liners,  mostly  on  the  grounds  of  blasphemy  or  denunciation  of  the  ideas  of  the 
revolution. Initially, as the banned publishers could still apply for a press license, many 
of the closed newspapers continued being published under a new name but with the 
same writing staff (Tarock 2001:595). However, in 1999 the hard-liners intensified their 
attack on the oppositional media by closing down nineteen opposition newspapers at the 
same  time.  Among  those  newspapers  was  one  of  the  most  influential  reformist 
newspapers in the country, Salam.
In response, students staged demonstrations to this move (Tarock 2001:591). In 
these protests, demands for the supreme leader to step down were growing louder than 
ever before (Arjomand 2000:291; Ashraf and Banuazizi 2001:252). Soft-liners could not 
hold the hard-liners back and the protests were violently suppressed, which had the 
unintended effect of mobilizing students all over the country. The government issued a 
ban on demonstrations, but it took the police and the vigilante groups five days to break 
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up the crowds. More than thousand people were arrested and at least dozen people died, 
while  president  Khatami  could  not  do  anything  other  than  issue  statements  calling 
protestors to stop (Tarock 2001:591; Keddie 2003:296-277).
Next year, hard-liners intensified their campaign against the opposition as well 
as the soft-liners. The minister of culture, Ataollah Mohajerani, faced impeachment and 
was forced to resign from office (Gheissari and Nasr 2006:139-140). Soft-liners had no 
control over the armed forces or the judiciary, so instead of stopping this crackdown, 
they themselves had to act very cautiously, lest the hard-liners force all of the soft-liners 
out of the government.
Meanwhile,  the  2000  parliamentary  elections  had  given  soft-liners  majority. 
Using their control of the legislative branch, soft-liners tried to ease the press laws, in 
order to take away the hard-liners' legal grounds to shut down Reformist and opposition 
newspapers and journals. Yet their bills were blocked by the supreme leader and the 
Guardian Council. The parliament tried to use the roundabout ways by passing binding 
reinterpretations of existing press laws. These efforts were also blocked by hard-liners 
(Arjomand 2009:266).
By the 2001 presidential election it was clear that the soft-liners were unable to 
reform the system from inside. President Khatami won the second term, but the impetus 
for change had died down (Takeyh 2009:195). There were some student demonstrations 
and strikes  by teachers  and bus  drivers,  but  all  in  all  the  popular  mobilization  had 
fizzled  out  (Maljoo  2006:31-32;  Gheissari  and  Nasr  2006:139).  Only  in  the  2004 
parliamentary elections and 2005 presidential  elections did the conservatives re-gain 
control over the executive and legislative branch (Gheissari and Nasr 2006:142-143), 
although real hope for a transition or at least a tangible reform had subsided long before.
Thus, there was no clear moment when the hard-liners took over. Instead, ever 
since  Khatami  and  other  soft-liners  assumed  office,  tactics  of  intimidation  and 
obstruction were used to discourage soft-liners and the opposition. In hindsight, this 
tactic of wearing their opponents down was probably even more effective than a clear 
coup d'état  would have been, as  a  clear  and sudden take over  may have  mobilized 
bigger parts of the population against conservative clerical rule. By selective repression, 
hard-liners could sow confusion, uncertainty and false hopes among those wanting to 
reform the system.
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As O'Donnell and Schmitter note (1991:56), popular mobilization is ephemeral 
by nature and will die down eventually. In Iran, the opposition did not manage to form a 
clear movement for change, and the prolonged stand-off between the hard-liners and 
their opponents slowly wore the enthusiasm of moderates and radicals down.
3.4. The consequences of Khatami's unsuccessful liberalization
Even though president Khatami's was unsuccessful in reforming the system, the 
liberalization  and  its  aftermath  forced  all  political  actors  –  soft-liners,  moderates, 
radicals and even hard-liners, to rethink their ideology and strategic postures.
By the 2005 presidential elections, many moderates had long given up the hope 
for  reforming the  government  from inside  and were now calling for  boycott  of  the 
elections.  Soft-liners  could not  come up with  a  clear  strategy and a  candidate,  and 
several  candidates  ran  under  the  “Reformist”  label,  which  split  the  votes  of  their 
supporters (Gheissari and Sanandaji 2009:278).
Hard-liners, however, went through a change as well. The long deadlock with 
soft-liners and their supporters in the opposition had convinced many hard-liners to pay 
more attention to the sentiments of the population. In the 1997 elections they had ran 
with the same slogans Khomeinei used in the 1979 revolution, essentially claiming that 
only Islamic clerics are fit to rule (Takeyh 2009:119). However, the pressure put on the 
clerics during the popular upsurge had shown that even the Islamic government could 
be overthrown if the economic situation is dire and the population unhappy.
Thus, in 2005 most of the conservative presidential candidates were calling for 
economic reform (Gheissari and Sanandaji 2009:278). This strategy attacked soft-liners' 
weakest spot, since Khatami's ideology had paid very little attention to the economic 
problems,  focusing  instead  on  the  cultural  and  social  issues  (Gheissari  and  Nasr 
2006:137).
Hard-liners in the armed forces recognized that the regime needed to address the 
“earthly” matters of bread and butter to stay in power. The 2005 presidential elections 
were won by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who came from a military background, and the 
parliamentary elections held the year before also showed that the number of politicians 
with military ties was growing (Gheissari and Nasr 2006:138; Takeyh 2009:234-235). 
24
Thus, the military has been getting considerably more involved in politics, while over 
time,  conflicts  between  them and  the  clerical  members  of  the  regime  have  grown 
(Takeyh 2009:236).
For the  opposition,  Khatami's  liberalization  policies  enabled  intellectuals  and 
non-governmental  organizations  to  regroup after  the  “cultural  revolution”  of  1980s, 
when  the  conservatives  purged  universities  and  other  academic  and  cultural 
organizations,  and  thousands  of  academics  and  members  of  the  intelligentsia  were 
arrested, imprisoned or forced into exile (Ashraf and Banuazizi 2001:242). The brief 
period of relaxed media censorship allowed the intellectuals and activists to exchange 
ideas and find sympathetic voices among their audience.
More  importantly,  soft-liners  realized  they  had  more  in  common  with  the 
opposition  than  with  the  hard-liners.  In  2009,  when  Ahmadinejad  won  his  second 
presidential term amid accusations of wide-spread electoral fraud, Khatami and many 
members of his government were already part of the opposition6. The demonstrations 
were brutally repressed, but this time a dominant oppositional movement, the so called 
Green Movement,  was formed. In comparison to  the popular  upsurge  of  the period 
when Khatami held presidency, the opposition had a comparatively clearer set of leaders
7.
Thus,  the  opposition  is  slowly  getting  better  at  organizing  and uniting  like-
minded people, while the current political system keeps fostering new factional rivalries 
among regime insiders.
4. The necessary conditions for a transition and the case of Iran
This chapter  explains why president  Khatami's  liberalization policies  did  not 
move on to a transition, ending instead with a stand-off between hard-liners, soft-liners 
and the oppositional forces. For this end, the three necessary conditions from the second 
chapter are applied on the empirical case of Iran.
6 Even more, he has become one of the leading figures of the Green Movement (Sahimi 2011).
7 See: Worth, Robert F. „Moussavi Forms 'Grass-Roots' Movement in Iran,” New York Times, August 
15, 2009. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/16/world/middleeast/16iran.html MacFarquhar, Neil 
„Mystery Deepens on Status of Iran Oppositional Leaders,” New York Times, Febuary 28, 2011. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/01/world/middleeast/01iran.html Yong, William „Iranian Leaders 
Vow to Crush March,“ New York Times, Febuary 13, 2011. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/14/world/middleeast/14iran.html
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4.1. First condition: soft-line leaders in the military
Condition: Even before introducing liberalizing reforms, soft-liners have at least a few  
important supporters in the armed forces.
During the presidency of Khatami from 1997 to 2005, hard-liners controlled all 
of the armed forces in Iran. Unlike most political systems, where the executive branch 
controls the military and the police, in Iran the supreme leader is the commander in 
chief of the armed forces (Kamrava and Hassan-Yari 2004:505). The supreme leader 
and his advisors also maintained control of the Ministry of Intelligence and Security 
(Jahanbegloo  2011:130).  Furthermore,  because  the  head  of  the  judiciary  is  also 
appointed  by  the  supreme leader  (Kamrava  and  Hassan-Yari  2004:505),  hard-liners 
could count on the loyalty of the courts and prosecutors.
The most influential  part  of the armed forces was the Revolutionary Guards. 
This institution was created after the 1979 revolution with the task to protect social 
order and the clerical government, and has its own naval and air forces (Abootalebi 
2000:49).  During  Khatami's  presidency,  Guards  maintained  their  full  loyalty  to  the 
supreme leader. In 1999, during the student protests,  24 commanding officers of the 
Revolutionary Guards wrote a threatening letter to president Khatami stating that they 
were ready to intervene any time the supreme leader  Khamenei  would tell  them to 
(Abootalebi 2000:49).
Admittedly  soft-liners  were  able  to  put  some  pressure  on  the  intelligence 
services with media's support. In the late 1990s, the relaxed media regulations enabled 
newspapers to report on the political killings and torture of the opposition leaders. For 
example,  after  the  1999  student  demonstrations,  where  the  policemen  attacked  and 
arrested thousands of protestors, after harsh criticism hard-liners allowed over a hundred 
policemen to be put on trial for the attacks, and supreme leader Khamenei replaced the 
head of the judiciary with a more pragmatic conservative (Keddie 2003:277). However, 
this was just a small concession. All in all, in terms of force, hard-liners had the upper 
hand over the soft-liners, and Khatami and his allies had to operate with the knowledge 
that if they were seen to overstep certain boundaries, a hard-line coup d'état  was very 
possible.
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4.2. Second condition: politically organized opposition
Condition:  liberalization  must  develop  far  enough  to  allow  autonomous  political  
organization with oppositional leaders who have broad support among the population.
This condition also remained unfilled. In fact, even political forces inside the 
regime were weakly organized. Iran has no dominant governmental party and the party 
system  is  very  fragmented8.  During  Khatami's  presidency,  there  were  three  clear 
factions  in  the  parliament,  each  composed  of  many  party-like  organizations  -  the 
Association of the Hizb Allah, representing the soft-liners; the Hizb Allah Members of 
Parliament, representing the hard-liners; and the Independent Hizb Allah Members who 
could support either one (Abootalebi 2000:48-49), but these factions did not become the 
leading actors during liberalization. Rather, they played the supporting role, helping the 
supreme leader and his advisors to curb Khatami's policies or from the other side, trying 
to pass more liberal press laws to support the Reformist government.
While the soft-line interior minister did relax the rules for registering political 
parties  (Keddie  2003:276),  no  strong opposition  parties  developed  in  the  course  of 
liberalization. Media remained as the main channel for debate, and while this allowed 
many different intellectuals, journalists, clerics, NGO activists and so on to express their  
views, this did not bring about a coherent movement.
Labor unions did not play a visible role in the popular upsurge stage either. Only 
in 2001, when the popular upsurge was already subsiding due to hard-liners' repression 
and general mobilization fatigue, did teachers start organizing wide-spread strikes to 
demand better pay. Bus workers held strikes in 2004, but just like the teachers, they 
were also unsuccessful in their efforts (Maljoo 2006:31-32).
This lack of political organization was a result of a combination of two factors. 
First, since the regime had held elections from the beginning, there was no “founding 
elections”  moment.  The  elections'  system  was  criticized  for  the  large  number  of 
candidates  who  were  disqualified  in  each  election  (Keddie  2003:275;  Arjomand 
8 There are several political parties in Iran, but they are underdeveloped. None of the authors cited in  
this paper consider them to be important players in Iran's politics – the source of legitimacy (supreme 
leader or the people) predicts the behavior of political actors considerably better. For an overview of 
Iran's party system, see Asayesh, Hossein; Halim, Adlina Ab.; Jawan, Jayum A.; Shojaei, Seyedeh 
Nosrat (2011) „Political Party in Islamic Republic of Iran: A Review“ Journal of Politics and Law 4 
(1), 221-230.
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2009:265), but this was not the main point of criticism for the opposition. Instead, the 
demands of the opposition were centered on the institution of the supreme leader and 
how he should be elected. Iran's political system placed most of the power in the hands 
of  two individuals  –  the  supreme leader  and the  president.  The debate  centered  on 
whether the clerically elected supreme leader or the popularly elected president should 
be  the  center  of  power.  Compared  to  this,  the  authority  of  the  parliament  was  a 
secondary issue. Had the parliamentary elections been the focus of the debate, then the 
opposition would probably have been more active in forming strong political parties.
Secondly, at least until the 1999 student protests, the opposition still tended to 
side with soft-liners. There is  a reason why most authors do not make a distinction 
between the soft-liners inside the government and the opposition and place them all 
under  the  general  label  of  Reformers.  While  the  opposition  went  further  in  their 
demands  for  change,  because  hard-liners  held  all  the  levers  of  repression,  they 
considered publicly supporting Khatami's presidency to be their best hope. Essentially, 
the  opposition  placed  its  bets  on  Khatami  and  did  not  form  its  own  political 
organizations.
The wide-scale demonstrations against the victory of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad 
after the 2009 presidential elections offer a contrast. Then the opposition did not have 
powerful  soft-line  regime  insiders  they  could  count  on,  and  formed  the  Green 
Movement. During Khatami's presidency, the hope that the regime could be reformed 
from the inside may have held the opposition back from politically organizing, because 
that could bring about unnecessary division in a time where those wanting to reform the 
system should be as united as possible.
4.3. Third condition: moderates dominating the opposition
Condition: moderates must be able to dominate the opposition.
During the period under study, moderates were able to dominate the opposition. 
As stated previously,  media was the center of the liberalization and popular upsurge. 
There,  debate centered  around the powers  and source of  legitimacy of  the supreme 
leader  (Arjomand  2009:260;  Tarock  2001:591-592;  Takeyh  2009:183)  and  not  on 
whether  the  government  and  the  religion  should  be  separated.  Thus,  media  was 
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dominated by the moderates.
The  radicals  advocating  for  a  secular  democracy  used  demonstrations  and 
protests to voice their statements, but even there they were joined by the moderates. 
Some authors state that the 1999 protests were about demanding for the supreme leader 
and other clerics to step down (Ashraf and Banuazizi 2001:252; Arjomand 2000:291), 
while others say that the main demand was still  that the supreme leader would stop 
directly interfering in politics (Tarock 2001:591). This shows that even the very claim 
that radicals dominated the protests is arguable.  Furthermore, as the student protests 
were violently repressed and many participants were arrested (Keddie 2003:276-277), 
and as this remained as the largest protest during Khatami's presidency, these protests 
made radicals weaker, not stronger.
All in all, only one of the three conditions, meaning the moderates dominating 
the opposition, was present during Khatami's presidency. The other two conditions – 
soft-line leaders in the military and a politically organized opposition, were missing. 
Although  many  different  explanations  for  the  failure  of  the  liberalization  and  the 
Reform movement  can  be  brought  out,  the  conditions  derived  from O'Donnell  and 
Schmitter's theory provide very plausible causes for why the soft-liners and moderates 
could not co-operate and why the hard-liners ended up dominating the government.
Had  the  opposition  formed  strong  oppositional  parties  during  the  popular 
upsurge, the costs of repression could have gone high enough to push the old regime 
from  power  even  with  the  armed  forces  under  hard-line  control.  However,  the 
combination of hard-line control over the military and lack of political organization in 
the  opposition  made  moving  repressing  dissent  easier  than  negotiating  with  the 
moderates.  In  fact,  the  fact  that  radicals  were  not  dominant  in  the  opposition  only 
lowered the costs of repression for hard-liners.
Conclusion
This thesis used transition theory on the empirical case of Iran under president 
Khatami, from 1997 to 2005, to analyze the dynamics of his reform efforts  and the 
structural causes behind his lack of success.
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O’Donnell and Schmitter’s theory claims that there is a causal relation between 
liberalization policies undertaken by authoritarian rulers, and popular mobilization that 
can force these rules to step down and allow democratic elections to take place. This 
process does not develop without plenty of conflicts and tensions. Instead, it is a result 
of the interaction of four political actors – hard-liners and soft-liners inside the regime, 
and moderates and radicals in the opposition.
Unless the opposition is able to force the authoritarian regime from power, this 
process tends to be a result of negotiations. When no actor is strong enough to dominate 
over others, they may agree to make a compromise and allow a new political system to 
be established, hopefully one which is competitive and open
At  least  three  conditions  must  be  filled  so  that  authoritarian  rulers  and 
oppositional forces could and would want to negotiate. First, soft-liners must have at 
least some control over the armed forces. Secondly, the opposition must be politically 
organized and have a strong leadership. Thirdly, moderate forces must dominate over 
the more radical actors of the opposition.
Under president Khatami, Iran went through an abortive liberalization which did 
not move on to the negotiations stage. Instead, liberalization and popular mobilization 
were followed by a long period of stand-off, with hard-liners on the one side and soft-
liners, moderates and radicals on the other side. Although there was an overlap between 
the aims of soft-liners and moderates, their efforts to co-operate against regime hard-
liners were in vain.
This was mainly because two of the necessary three conditions for negotiations 
were absent. First, hard-liners had almost complete control over the armed forces, as 
well as the intelligence services, the judiciary and the police. Secondly, opposition did 
not organize into political parties or strong labor unions. The combination of these two 
factors  meant  that  the  costs  of  repressing  oppositional  voices  were  relatively  low. 
Therefore,  the  only  satisfied  condition  –  moderates  dominating  the  opposition  over 
radicals  –  was insufficient  to  motivate  political  actors  to  negotiate  with  each other. 
Furthermore, it possibly lowered the costs of repression even further.
These three conditions could be described as the institutional and organizational 
causes  for  Khatami’s  failure.  Although  he  stayed  in  office  until  2005,  most  of  his 
supporters had lost hope in the possibility of reforming the system from inside already 
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by 1999 or 2000. However, his presidency had allowed oppositional forces to regroup 
themselves, while forcing the hard-liners to rethink their strategy for staying in power.
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Kokkuvõte: Liberaliseerimine kui režiimisiirde päästik: president Khatami 
edutu reformikatse Iraanis
Käesolev  bakalaureusetöö  analüüsib  Iraani  presidendi  Mohammad  Khatami 
reformikatseid  ja  sellega  raames  ette  võetud  liberaliseerimisprogrammi  Guillermo 
O’Donnell’i ja Philippe C. Schmitteri režiimisiirete teooria alusel. Töö eesmärgiks oli 
eristada  liberaliseerimise  käigus  kujunenud  poliitilised  tegutsejad  nende 
tegutsemisstrateegiate alusel, välja  selgitada nende tegutsejate koostööeelistused ning 
uurida,  kas  režiimisiirdeks  vajalikud  tingimused  olid  vaatlusalusel  perioodil  Iraanis 
täidetud.
Töö teoreetiline  raamistik  põhineb O’Donnell’i  ja  Schmitteri  teoorial.  Nende 
kahe  akadeemiku  väitel  panevad  autoritaarsete  valitsejate  algatatud 
liberaliseerimiskatsed  tihti  aluse  opositsiooni  mobiliseerumisele,  mis  võib  kujuneda 
niivõrd ulatuslikuks, et sunnib autoritaarsed valitsejad ametist lahkuma ja lubab välja 
kuulutada demokraatlikud valimised. Nende jaoks on siire nelja poliitilise tegutseja – 
võimulolevate kõvakäeliste ja pehmekäeliste ning opositsiooni kuuluvate mõõdukate ja 
radikaalsete jõudude omavahelise konkurentsi tagajärg.
Pehmekäelised ehk reformimeelsed usuvad, et kriisi oludes peab valitsus lubama 
kodanikel „auru välja lasta“ ja pooldab seega poliitikaid, mis lõdvendavad autoritaarse 
riigi  haaret  oma  elanikkonna  üle,  lubades  neile  näiteks  suuremat  sõnavabadust  või 
autonoomsete  ühingute  loomise  õigust.  Kõvakäelised  ehk  konservatiivid  on  sellele 
vastu,  väites  et  rahulolematus  tuleb  maha  suruda  kasvõi  vägi  valla  abiga,  aga 
liberaliseerumine  destabiliseeriks  süsteemi.  Mõõdukad  kuuluvad  opositsiooni,  kuid 
püüavad vältida kõvakäeliste välja vihastamist ning on valmis tegema pehmekäelistega 
kompromisse,  juhul  kui  see  veenab  autoritaarseid  valitsejaid  võimult  lahkuma. 
Radikaalid kuuluvad samuti opositsiooni, kuid nemad ei ole nõus režiimiga läbi rääkima 
ning eelistavad oma nõudmisi esitada protestide ja demonstratsioonide kaudu.
Kui  ükski  neljast  poliitilisest  tegutsejast  ei  ole  piisavalt  tugev,  et  teiste  üle 
domineerida ning neid maha suruda, siis võivad pehmekäelised ja mõõdukad otsustada 
asuda omavahel  läbirääkimisi  pidama.  Läbirääkimiste  käigus antakse autoritaarsetele 
valitsejatele  piisavalt  palju  garantiisid  ja  järeleandmisi,  et  nad oleksid nõus võimult 
lahkuma.  Jõudude  ummikseisu  võib  niisiis  olla  võimaldada  üles  ehitada  uus, 
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loodetavasti demokraatlik, poliitiline režiim.
Iraan  on  ebademokraatlik  riik,  kus  kõrgeim  võim  riigis  kuulub  kõrgeimale 
usujuhile (the supreme leader), kes on ametis oma elu lõpuni ning kes ei ole valitud 
rahva poolt.
Siiski on Iraanil  ka rahva poolt  valitav president ning just president  Khatami 
valitsemisajal aastatel 1997 kuni 2005 tegi Iraan läbi liberaliseerimise, mille eesmärgiks 
oli riigi poliitilist süsteemi reformida. Opositsioonil lubati vabamalt arvamust avaldada, 
eriti  läbi  vähem  tsenseeritud  ajakirjanduse.  Juba  kostis  lootusrikkaid  hääli,  mis 
ennustasid Iraani demokratiseerumist.  Khatami reformikatse osutus aga edutuks ning 
liberaliseerimisega kaasnenud vabadused ja tagatised, näiteks suurem meediavabadus 
ning lihtsustatud kord mittetulundusühingute registreerimiseks, võeti tagasi. See juhtus 
sellest  hoolimata,  et  Khatami  ja  teiste  pehmekäeliste  ja  opositsiooni  kuuluvate 
mõõdukate seisukohtade vahel oli rohkelt sarnasusi, mis oleks võimaldanud neil teha 
koostööd.
Liberaliseerumine  kukkus  läbi  ja  ei  toonud kaasa  režiimisiirde  sellepärast,  et 
kaks kolmest läbirääkimiste toimumiseks vajalikust tingimusest ei olnud Khatami ajal 
Iraanis  täidetud.  Esiteks  omasid  kontrolli  sõjaväe  ja  teiste  vägivallaorganite  üle 
konservatiivsed kõvakäelised, mitte opositsiooniga koostöö tegemise osas paindlikumad 
pehmekäelised jõud. Teiseks ei olnud opositsioonis välja kujunenud tugevaid poliitilisi 
organisatsioone, vaid nii mõõdukad kui radikaalsed jõud jäid killustatuteks. Seetõttu oli 
kõvakäelistel  lihtne  opositsiooni  vägivalla  abil  maha  suruda,  mis  tugevamalt 
organiseerunud ja mobiliseerinud vastase korral niivõrd lihtne ei oleks olnud.
Kolmas  režiimisiirdeks  vajalik  tingimus  oli  Iraanis  täidetud  –  mõõdukad 
domineerisid  radikaalide  üle.  Kui  läbirääkimised  pehmekäeliste  ja  mõõdukate  vahel 
oleksid olnud võimalikud, siis oleks see tingimus andnud autoritaarsetele valitsejatele 
kindluse,  et  need,  kellega  nad läbi  rääkima  asuvad  suudavad  tegelikkuses  ka  antud 
lubadusi täita. Kuna eelmised kaks režiimisiirde tingimust ei olnud aga täidetud, siis 
tegi asjaolu, et opositsiooni peamiseks nõudmiste esitamise kanaliks oli ajakirjandus, 
mitte tänavatel protestimine, opositsiooni maha surumise ainult lihtsamaks.
Nii  oli  juba  2000.  aastaks  selge,  et  Khatami  ei  suuda  süsteemi  seestpoolt 
reformida. Küll oli tema presidendiks oleku aeg andnud opositsioonile võimaluse välja 
kujundada  ühised  seisukohad  ning  leida  mõttekaaslasi.  Aastal  2009,  mil  Iraanis 
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lahvatasid presidendivalimiste järel ulatuslikud protestid, oli opositsioon juba oluliselt 
paremini organiseerunud. Kuigi seekord jäi neil puudu režiimisisestest  toetusest ning 
nende  meeleavaldused  suruti  vägivaldselt  maha,  näitas  Roheliseks  Liikumiseks 
organiseerunud protestiliikumine,  et  Khatami aegne liberaliseerimine oli  opositsiooni 
koosseisule ja nõudmistele avaldanud tugevat mõju.
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